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 The value of the shares is not important because people are not interested in buying our 
shares and we are not interested in trying to promote the value of our shares. 
 
Vincent Bollore, French Corporate Raider, on his family’s publicly listed company 
(Simmons and Silver, 2003) 
 
Shareholders are stupid and impertinent - stupid because they give their money to 
somebody else without any effective control over what this person is doing with it - 
impertinent because they ask for a dividend as a reward for their stupidity 
 
Carl Furstenberg, German Banker (Zingales and Rajan, 2003) 
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 CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND  
PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Ownership structures vary considerably across Europe. This paper aims to quantify these 
differences by comparing three distinct ownership structures of firms, widely held, de-facto 
control and legal control. We then relate them to the trend component of share prices. It is 
based on a new and unique data set of uniform ownership data for the largest 100 firms in the 
five major European economies. To measure performance, we employ a filtering technique 
that is commonly used in macro-economics to decompose GDP data into a trend and cyclical 
component. For the first time, we apply this technique to isolate the long term share price 
trend from other effects. We take this trend as a good indirect indicator of the quality of 
governance. We observe significant performance differences between the various ownership 
categories and show that these ownership structures are not consistent with value 
maximisation principles. Our findings are in contradiction to similar research in the US. The 
paper is organised as follows: we briefly review the literature on corporate governance, 
ownership and performance in section 2. Section 3 outlines data and methodology while 
section 4 depicts our results. Section 5 discusses the findings and draws preliminary 
conclusions. 
 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
The underlying problems of corporate governance in a world of incomplete contracts are well 
documented. The separation of ownership and control of the private corporation gives rise to 
a principal-agent problem, which can result in the sub-optimal use of capital (Stiglitz and 
Edlin, 1995 and Shleifer and Vishny 1998). In an environment of highly dispersed ownership, 
the individual shareholder has little or no incentive to monitor management. As monitoring is 
a costly procedure, the marginal cost of monitoring often exceeds the marginal benefits of 
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improved performance. Monitoring becomes a public good, as every shareholder benefits 
from the monitoring activities of others (Stiglitz, 1982).  
 
As early as 1932, Berle and Means pointed out the fundamental principal-agent conflict in the 
United States.i There, firms had transformed themselves from privately owned and 
entrepreneurial driven entities into public companies, to reap the benefits of scale and scope 
available in the domestic market of the time (Chandler, 1990). Over the last twenty years, 
Europe has also witnessed fundamental changes in how ownership is organised. Large scale 
privatisation programmes significantly reduced government control and moved enterprises 
into the private sector, and many previously privately controlled firms raised equity capital on 
public markets for the first time.ii, The issues of efficient ownership structures and corporate 
governance are particularly salient for the European Union, as a vastly greater percentage of 
GDP flows through publicly listed companies that are nevertheless controlled by a small 
number of shareholders or shareholder coalitions.  
 
Corporate Governance is concerned with solving the agency problem that Berle and Means 
identified, by designing mechanisms that assure providers of capital security of return on 
their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It has developed mechanisms to mitigate the 
agency problem. The available measures can be divided into internal control mechanisms 
within the firm, and external control mechanisms outside the firm.iii The efficiency of these 
mechanisms varies depending on the prevailing economic and political systems, the dominant 
industrial sectors and labour relations in each country. 
 
It is argued that deficiencies in national Corporate Governance structures are mitigated by 
higher concentrations of ownership. For example, La Porta et al. (1996, 1997 and 1998) 
argue that ownership concentration and institutional differences are a response to differing 
degrees of legal protection of minority shareholders across countries. Roe (2003), Pagano and 
Lombardo (1999) and Pagano and Volpin (2001) argue that political determinants primarily 
explain differences in ownership concentration. However, it is clear that significant 
differences exist in ownership structures within the European Union (Barca and Becht, 2001 
and Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
 
In this paper, we are interested in establishing what impact ownership has on the performance 
of the firm relative to its peer group with alternative ownership arrangements. In addition, our 
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consistent data across countries allows us to make comparisons about the efficiency of 
differing ownership arrangements. 
 
The impact of ownership on firm performance is twofold. On the one hand, concentrated 
ownership can provide for better control of management, as size of ownership stake and the 
incentive to monitor are positively correlated. In turn, this should improve firm performance 
and equally benefit minority shareholders. On the other hand, it can come with costs for 
minority shareholders as the controlling owners might try to expropriate from them. This is 
one of a number of private control benefits enjoyed by large block holders at the expense of 
firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1988). A number of surveys 
have attempted to measure these at the country level. For example, Nenova (2000) documents 
differing levels of private control benefits across a large cross-section of countries reflected 
in premiums paid for voting shares.iv Dyck and Zingales (2004) document similar control 
premia paid in European block trades. Bebchuk (1999) argues that it is rational for block 
holders to grab these private control benefits before managers do.. 
 
The existing literature is split concerning the effect of ownership on performance. Bebchuk 
and Roe (1999) and Roe (2003) argue that what, at face value, appear to be inefficient 
ownership structures (whether dispersed or concentrated), are in fact efficient in the context 
of their institutional environment. Coffee (1999, p. 3) argues that the current ownership 
arrangements are more a “product of a path-dependent history than the ‘neutral’ result of an 
inevitable evolution toward greater efficiency”. If this second proposition is correct, then the 
predominant ownership structure might not necessarily be the best performing one. 
This suspicion is confirmed by Thomsen et al. (2003) who pointed out that blockholders 
might destroy firm value when studying firms in the largest continental European countries. 
Nevertheless, all the above evidence clearly implies that ownership structures matter for firm 
performance, whether positively or negatively.  
 
Acemoglu (1999b, 2004) has pointed out that the long-run equilibrium of economic 
institutions is often sub-optimal. Reform of institutional arrangements, within which we 
include corporate control and governance arrangements, might imply a possible loss to 
groups that currently hold power. It is argued that as these groups cannot be credibly 
compensated ex-post for their loss of power, they have an incentive to block change. The 
implication is that ownership structures might not adjust perfectly to changes in economic 
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conditions or the needs of the firm. This view, which is in line with our findings in section 
IV, would predict that we see inefficient ownership structures persist over time. As Zingales 
and Rajan (2003, p. 2) state, “financial systems do not …. emerge simply as a result of their 
superiority in a particular environment. The power of vested interest distorts the process of 
evolution.” 
 
These findings are in clear contradiction to Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001). They argue that an optimal ownership structure is achieved through 
private contracting between shareholders and management based on the value maximisation 
principle. The financing costs of concentrated ownership increases with firm size because 
families, and other controlling investors, cannot diversify their portfolio. Therefore, a firm 
has a natural incentive to move to a more diffuse ownership structure, and we should observe 
an optimal ownership structure where the benefits of control and financing are at an 
equilibrium. Consequently, they argue that no relation between the two variables can be 
detectable, and empirically found no relationship between ownership structure and 
performance for a sample of US firms between 1976 and 1980. 
 
Therefore, in this study we set out to examine the available evidence about the association 
between ownership and performance, and to evaluate the stated hypothesis put forward by 
Roe and Coffee as well as Demsetz. 
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 III. Data Set and Methodology 
 
Data 
 
We have collected ownership data for all closely held shares for the top 110 public 
companies in Germany, UK, France, Italy and Spain, from both Bloomberg and Factset, and 
cross-verified our data sample. Ownership data is inherently unreliable and the use of a single 
data source (as in the case for most papers in the field) limits the generalisability of the 
results. In cases where both sources showed identical results, we assumed that the data was 
correct. In the case of discrepancies, we consulted other sources including regulatory listings, 
public statements, news sources, and industry and city analysts.v The result is a unique new 
data set of consistent and reliable ownership data across the five countries under 
investigation. We removed those firms from the sample for which we could not produce 
reliable ownership data. In addition, we excluded investment trusts, asset managers, 
insurance companies, real estate investment companies, listed foreign subsidiaries and 
companies with free float of less than 10% of share capital. Our sample holds 97 firms for 
Germany, 94 for Spain, 93 for France, 97 for Italy and 100 for the UK.  
 
Share price data – our performance measure – was sourced from Factset and DataStream on a 
quarterly base. Both ownership and performance data was collected in October 2002. 
Ownership data describes the ownership status at that point in time, and performance data 
covers a period of 10 years prior to that date. In addition, and unlike the previous literature, 
we are focusing on shareholder groups that have a substantial interest in the firm and can, 
individually and together, exert varying degrees of control. We call this group of shares 
“closely held”. We take both the largest single shareholder and the top three shareholders, 
and see if individually, and combined, they can exert a certain degree of control over the 
firm.  
 
We believe that the control benefits of small, but substantial, shareholder groups can easily 
outweigh the co-ordination costs of such a combination. A pure research focus on the largest 
shareholder of a company is, from our point of view, not appropriate in isolation, and often 
not in line with reality. We are trying to overcome the limitations of the literature by moving 
beyond this and focusing, where applicable, on shareholder groups. 
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Methodology 
 
In this paper, we are analysing the relationship between control and performance. To 
undertake this analysis, we group ‘control’ in three distinct ownership categories: Legal 
Control (LC), De-Facto Control (DC) and Widely Held (WH) firms. Owners hold Legal 
Control of firms, where either one shareholder or a shareholder group controls over 50% of 
the votes at the annual general meeting.vi We defined De Facto Control for each country in 
line with the national mandatory bid threshold. This is the level of ownership of voting shares 
at which local regulators have concluded a shareholder will have significant influence on the 
outcome of decisions at the annual meeting. A shareholder who breaches the threshold is 
required to make a mandatory tender offer for all outstanding shares. 
 
 
Table 1: Mandatory Bid Thresholds in Europe 
France 33.3% 
Italy 30% 
Germany 30% 
Spainvii 25% 
UK 30% 
 
Widely Held is the remaining ownership category, where no single shareholder or tied group 
of shareholders own a percentage of voting share capital above the mandatory bid threshold. 
 
The analysis of the performance effects of ownership relies on a market-based measure. Such 
measurement is preferable to accounting-based measure, as it allows the comparison of 
European data without regard for different national accounting conventions. Share prices 
encompass the future expectations of investors, giving us a broader measure of performance.  
 
A number of recent studies have questioned the empirical measurement of the effectiveness 
of corporate governance. Börsch-Supan and Köke (2000, p. 1) have pointed out that 
“empirical studies on corporate governance have more than the usual share of econometric 
problems”. These authors and Ødegaard and Bøhran (2003) centre their criticism around the 
high data requirements and data availability of these studies that aim to analyse, for example, 
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mechanisms of governance and control, including the board structure, management 
ownership, and compensation. 
 
From our point of view, corporate governance is a dynamic system of interdependent control 
mechanisms. This means that shortcomings in one control category might be over-
compensated by alternative mechanisms. However, it is also possible that the dominance of 
one corporate governance mechanism means the suppression of another one. For example, 
strong owners might try to weaken alternative control mechanisms to gain almost perfect 
control over the firm. Although, the weakness in corporate governance regulation in some 
countries might duly be compensated by higher ownership concentration.  
 
Moreover, a weakness in the performance of a firm may lead to changes in the governance 
arrangements. In consequence, exogenous or independent variables are perceived to be 
endogenous, and any econometric work might suffer from reverse causality., However, we 
found when analysing selected cases in great depth and over long periods of time that 
European ownership structures seem to be very stable per se. More importantly though, even 
if significant changes to ownership occur, firms hardly ever seem to move out of their 
respective ownership categories. In summary, endogeneity seems to be far less important in a 
European context and particularly in our setup than previously thought.  
 
Our aim was to develop a methodology that allows us to precisely measure the long term 
performance of the firm, and so indirectly that of management and governance, while 
eliminating firm specific business cycles and many other external factors that might 
temporarily effect business performance, and for which only limited amounts of information 
and structured data is available. 
 
To measure performance, we employ a filtering technique that is commonly used in macro-
economics to decompose GDP data into a trend and cyclical component. For the first time, 
we apply this technique to share price data to isolate the long term share price trend from 
other effects. To estimate the firm level long term trend growth in Europe, we employ a low-
frequency Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to isolate the trend from cyclical fluctuations. We take 
this trend as a good indirect indicator of the quality of governance.. 
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We group all firms in three ownership categories, and calculate average quarterly returns of 
the long term trend performance of each firm per ownership group. This allows us to draw 
inferences about the comparative long-term performance of the various groups. We base our 
analysis on the log of quarterly share prices Then we isolate the trend component using the 
HP filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1980; Stock and Watson, 1998 and 2003) and calculate the 
quarterly growth rate as ln(pt/pt-1). In principle, a low frequency filter removes all cyclical 
components above a certain frequency. We believe that by employing this methodology we 
can estimate the long term growth of the firm – in itself a good indicator of the quality of the 
governance arrangements - while removing all cyclical components. 
 
Prescott describes the HP filter as an approximation of the more precise band-pass filter. The 
HP filter usually eliminates all frequencies lower than eight years. One disadvantage of the 
HP filter is that it captures only a subset of the time series variation, leaving a certain cyclical 
component with the trend. In addition, this effect is amplified by the fact that our available 
data set is limited to ten years while eliminating trend cycles below eight years, further 
underestimating the cyclical component at both ends of the time series. Although this limits 
the use of the absolute result of the trend approximation to a certain degree, we are, however, 
primarily interested in the relative performance of the three ownership categories. As the firm 
specific cycles correlate well with the overall business cycle, this should cancel out the 
negative aspects described above (King and Rebelo, 1993). 
 
We calculated our results for both a quarterly-rebalanced portfolio as reported in the rest of 
this paper and for a stable sample of firms. Using a quarterly-rebalanced portfolio has the 
advantage of including all the information that is available in the sample by including all 
firms that have entered the market over the last 10 years. A stable sample excludes those 
firms. As the results from the two samples are almost identical, we only report the results for 
the rebalanced portfolio. 
 
We report our results in form of the cumulative distribution function per ownership category 
and test for significant differences in relation to other ownership categories. The results 
should be read in the form that a certain percentage of all quarterly returns are below a given 
return threshold. Therefore, the better performing a group, the further it will be on the right 
hand side of the chart. We find first-order stochastic dominance, and therefore strictly better 
performance, for many of our ownership groups. We control for risk by using an adjusted ex-
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post Sharpe ratio. The ratio expresses the quarterly return per unit of variability of all returns 
of this ownership category.  
 
In summary, we isolate the component of long term growth in the share price that represents 
the effective management of the firm. In turn, we would argue that this component is driven 
by a good governance structure which effectively monitors and incentivises managers to 
maximise the value of the firm in the interests of all shareholders, and minimises, as far as 
possible, principle agent issues. 
 
 
IV. Ownership and Performance 
 
The following section discusses the differences in performance of the various ownership 
categories (legal control, de-facto control and widely held ownership) at the country level.  
 
France: In France, the dominant form of ownership is legal control, while the best 
performing category is de-facto control, with an ownership block between 33.3% and 50% of 
the voting shares. The performance differences between de facto control and widely held 
firms as well as firms under legal control are significant at the 1% level for both the risk-
adjusted and un-adjusted returnsviii. This indicates that in France those firms that are 
controlled by minority shareholders achieve genuinely better returns without accepting a 
higher degree of risk. After adjusting for risk, widely held firms were the worst performing 
ownership group, while before risk-adjustment widely-held firms performed as well as firms 
under legal control. 
AQR WH LC DC WH Sharpe WH LC DC WH
Mean 2.46% 2.47% 4.35% Mean 0.027 0.033 0.064
Variance 0.00011 0.00012 0.00026 Variance 0.00013 0.00021 0.00057
N 34 48 13 N 34 48 13
t t
t t
t t
-0.078
-5.970*** -7.123***
-8.771***
-1.799*
-6.156***
WH: Widely Held; LC: Legal Control; DC: De-facto Control 
Table 2 a,b: Average quarterly returns (AQR, left) and risk adjusted average quarterly returns (right) per 
ownership group in France 
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 Figure 1: Control Structure and Performance in France 
 
Interestingly, companies with legal control only marginally outperform widely held ones, 
suggesting that investors in France are essentially indifferent between the two categories. In 
turn, this might point to a failure to establish an effective corporate governance system that 
protects minority investors interests from dominant shareholders where there is legal control, 
and from senior managers where the firm is widely held. La Porta et al. (1998), point out 
France has a civil law system, which in their study is synonymous with low minority investor 
protection. As stated, while minority investors look to large block holders to monitor 
management and stem expropriation, they run the risk of expropriation and exploitation of 
private control benefits by these block holders. Given the alternative ownership structures of 
the French system, minority investors seem to want block holders to monitor management, 
but within the de facto control structure which collectively gives them a veto on major 
strategic decisions. Therefore, based on its relative out-performance, the de facto control 
structure provides the most effective governance system within the French institutional 
context.  However, the fact that legal control is the largest ownership category with over 50% 
of the sample, indicates that French ownership structures are inefficient. 
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Germany: In Germany the dominant form of ownership is also legal control. However, the 
best performing companies are widely held. Companies under de facto control are the next 
best performing group, and legal control the worst performing. The performance effect is 
statistically significant for all groups at the 1% level, except between the widely held and de-
facto control group. After adjusting for risk, widely held firms remain the best performing 
group, followed again by the de-facto control group. The performance differences remain 
significant between the widely held and legal control group, and become significant between 
the de-facto and legal control group at the 1% level. Put differently, the legal control group 
significantly underperforms all other ownership categories. 
 
WH: Widely Held; LC: Legal Control; DC: De-facto Control 
AQR WH LC DC WH Sharpe WH LC DC WH
Mean 2.73% 1.25% 1.70% Mean 0.040 0.014 0.031
Variance 0.00036 0.00029 0.00024 Variance 0.00077 0.00034 0.00081
N 26 53 26 N 26 53 26
t t
t t
t t 1.363
3.606***
-1.202 -3.204***
4.896***
2.613**
Table 3 a,b: Average quarterly returns (AQR, left) and risk adjusted average quarterly returns (right) per 
ownership group in Germany 
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 Figure 2: Control Structure and Performance in Germany 
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This would suggest there is better protection for minority shareholders in Germany relative to 
France, and therefore less need for blockholders to monitor management to protect their 
interests. Private control benefits in Germany are less than in France. This is in line with the 
findings of Nenova (2000), who measures private control benefits across countries, finding 
them equal to 28% of market capitalisation in France, which she terms “alarmingly high” (p. 
4) versus 9.5% in Germany and 4.5% in common law jurisdictions generally.ix However, they 
are still substantial enough to incentivise dominant shareholders to maintain control in over 
50% of the German companies in the sample. Ultimately, this has the effect of driving the 
relative underperformance of firms controlled by block holders, and is a strong indication that 
German ownership structures are inefficient. 
 
Spain: In Spain, the dominant form of ownership is legal control, but again the best 
performing ownership structure is the widely held category. The performance differences 
between widely-held firms and firms with both legal and de-facto control are significant at 
the 1% level. After adjusting for risk, the de-facto control group is the best performing group, 
however the only significant relationship (at the 1% level) is the out-performance of the 
widely held over the legal control group. 
AQR WH LC DC WH Sharpe WH LC DC WH
Mean 4.05% 2.65% 2.46% Mean 0.038 0.027 0.045
Variance 0.00029 0.00042 0.00046 Variance 0.00027 0.00028 0.00153
N 28 45 19 N 28 45 19
t 3.278*** t 2.984***
t t
t t3.634***
-1.020
0.063
0.402
 
WH: Widely Held; LC: Legal Control; DC: De-facto Control 
Table 4 a,b: Average quarterly returns (AQR, left) and risk adjusted average quarterly returns (right) per 
ownership group in Spain 
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 Figure 3: Control Structure and Performance in Spain 
 
Therefore, based on its relative out-performance, the widely held control and de-facto control 
structures seem to provide the most effective governance system within the Spanish 
institutional context. However, the fact that legal control is the largest ownership category 
with almost 50% of the sample indicates also for Spain that the pre-dominate ownership 
structure is inefficient.x
 
 
United Kingdom: In the UK, widely held firms predominate, providing investors with little 
choice in terms of control structure. Only 4% of firms in the FTSE 100 fall under the de facto 
control heading, and 3% under legal control.  
 
This finding is in line with La Porta et al.(1998) and Nenova (2000) that common law 
systems provide stronger protection of investor rights, and therefore might act as a driver of 
widely held corporate structures. A deep and efficient capital market and UK listing rules 
which actively discourage block-holdings of above 30% are just two out of many other 
explanations that can be put forward to explain the strong dominance of the widely-held 
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ownership group. Undoubtedly, investors seem to be confident that the information provided 
by the firms and the corporate governance mechanisms are sufficient to monitor and 
discipline management and feel that they do not have to rely on block-holders to take on this 
function. In addition, evidence is available to support the notion that block-holders cannot 
exploit private control benefits in the UK, making the holding of large blocks less interesting.  
Nenova (2000), for example, finds that private control benefits in the UK equal to only about 
9.5% of the market capitalisations of the firms concerned. Dyck and Zingales (2004) survey 
finds a substantially lower control premium of 2%.xi However, given the low number of firms 
with alternative ownership arrangements, we cannot draw any conclusions about the relative 
performance of the three ownership categoriesxii. 
UK WH LC DC Sharpe WH LC DC
Mean 2.25% 2.94% 1.27% Mean 0.030 0.122 0.033
Variance 0.00017 0.00024 0.00006 Variance 0.00031 0.00414 0.00040
N 93 3 4 N 93 3 4
 
Table 5a,b: Average quarterly returns (AQR, left) and risk adjusted average quarterly returns (right) per 
ownership group in the UK. 
 
 
Italy: Finally, the Italian data illustrates the out-performance in the Italian equities markets of 
companies that have a single, legal controlling shareholder or group with a block over 50% of 
the voting shares. Uniquely in our sample, this group is also the dominant ownership group. 
However, the sample of companies is heavily biased toward legal control as the dominant 
ownership structure with 65% of companies falling into it. The De-facto control group is the 
next best performing control group. Widely held companies are the worst performers for most 
of the period. Moreover, the widely held sample, 16% of firms, is dominated by banks.  
These often have a unique ownership and regulatory structure, and are controlled by 
foundations with special control rights, and cannot be treated as standard public companies 
(Galbraith, 2002). However, only the performance differences between widely held firms and 
firms with legal control are statistically significant at the 5% level, limiting somewhat the 
generalisability of our results. After controlling for risk, the performance differences between 
those two groups remained significant at the 5% level, the differences between the legal and 
de-facto control group became significant at the 10% level. 
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I WH LC DC WH Sharpe WH LC DC WH
Mean 1.83% 2.49% 2.28% Mean 0.022 0.023 0.020
Variance 0.00022 0.00020 0.00037 Variance 0.00032 0.00018 0.00028
N 15 69 18 N 15 69 18
t t
t t
t t
0.543
-1.144
1.006
0.554
-1.980* -0.357
Table 6a,b: Average quarterly returns (AQR, left) and risk adjusted average quarterly returns (right) per 
ownership group in Italy. 
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 Figure 4: Control Structure and Performance in Italy 
 
Therefore, we are left to conclude that there are no widely held public companies amongst the 
top one hundred in Italy. In turn, this points to the failure to establish an effective corporate 
governance system that protects minority investors in line with La Porta et al. (1998). While 
minority investors look to large block holders, in the Italian case families and the state, to 
monitor management and stem expropriation, they of course run the risk of expropriation and 
exploitation of private control benefits by these block holders. Nenova (2000) estimates that 
private control benefits for dominant shareholders in Italy to be approximately 29% of market 
capitalisation, one of the highest in her survey and again “alarmingly high” (p. 4) in her 
words, while Dyck and Zingales (2004) place it even higher at 37%. 
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V. Robustness Test 
 
To ensure that our documented results are truly one of ownership and not the effect of other 
variables like industry, liquidity or the type of owner, we have regressed the average long 
term performance of each firm against ownership and controlled for industry and country 
effects, liquidity expressed as a percentage of the free float of all outstanding shares, and type 
of the largest owner. Due to the above discussed endogeneity issues, it cannot be ruled out 
that we simply document associations between these two variables. In any case, we show 
below that firms under legal control significantly underperform widely held firms in Europe. 
More importantly, we show that our documented performance differences are not due to 
industry, country or liquidity effects. In addition, the type of owner has no significant impact 
on performance other than the value destructive effect of state ownership. 
 
Regressors Average Quarterly 
Performance 
(Constant) 0.035 *** 
 (0.011)  
Legal Control -0.010 * 
 (0.006)  
De-facto Control 0.002  
 (0.006)  
  
Free Float [%] -0.012  
 (0.010)  
  
Spain 0.011 * 
 (0.006)  
Germany -0.004  
 (0.006)  
Italy 0.005  
 (0.006)  
France 0.007  
 (0.005)  
  
Family 0.001  
 (0.006)  
Financial -0.002  
 (0.006)  
Corporate -0.007  
 (0.006)  
State -0.017 ** 
 (0.008)  
Misc. 0.006  
 (0.011)  
***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, ***:  significant at 10% 
Equation also includes 10 industry dummies. 
Excluded Variables: UK, Institutional, Widely held. 
Standard error in parenthesis. 
Table 7: Effects of ownership on long term firm performance 
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 VI. Summary and Discussion 
 
In this paper, we have shown that ownership matters in Europe. In a number of major 
European economies, the dominant form of ownership is not the most efficient one. Across 
Continental Europe, legal control by a large shareholder, or coalition of shareholders who 
control the board, is the dominant ownership category. We documented for Germany and 
Spain that widely held firms significantly outperform those under legal control. Firms in the 
United Kingdom are almost exclusively widely held. The predominance of legal control is 
puzzling as, from a wealth maximisation perspective, the dominant blockholder(s) would 
benefit from holding a more diversified portfolio of assets. Corporate owners would serve 
their shareholders better by investing in internal projects with higher pay backs or returning 
money to shareholders via share buybacks. 
 
The results clearly contradict the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who argue that 
ownership arrangements vary in ways that are consistent with value maximisation, and that 
consequently one should not be able to observe systematic differences between ownership 
and performance. This is in clear contradiction to our findings, where we have shown that 
ownership structures in Europe are often inefficient. 
 
In line with similar findings by Acemoglu (2004) on institutions, we would argue that it is 
difficult to give these dominant owners the ability to participate in the future gains from 
improved ownership. The introduction of mandatory bid thresholds might act as a further 
disincentive, as sellers of ownership blocks would have to place these widely in the future, 
likely forgoing a control premium. Moreover, dominant shareholders may also face 
significant capital gains tax bills, which act as another hurdle to selling down large ownership 
stakes. It is also very hard to compensate for the loss of non-pecuniary benefits.xiii 
Consequently, there is little incentive to realign ownership structures in Europe.xiv 
 
One possible explanation for the good performance of widely held firms might be 
fundamental changes in the nature of European capital markets and their governance 
institutions in the 1990s. Such changes include, but are not limited too, increased liquidity, 
disclosure requirements, information flows and legal protection of minority shareholders (e.g. 
introduction of pan-European insider trading regulations). 
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Encouraging owners to sell down their stakes should help to maximise the value of the firm 
and the wealth of shareholders. All shareholders would benefit from the re-rating of the stock, 
as markets clearly prefer simplified control structures (Shinn and Gourevitch, 2002). The 
literature points out the benefits of increased liquidity, which include a lower cost of capital 
and risk adjustment of returns, which in turn are reflected in a price premiumxv. It also allows 
capital to be efficiently shifted across sectors and geographies (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 
2001/2003). 
 
Our argument finds support from Zingales and Rajan (2003), who point out that ownership 
dispersion and less concentrated control is ultimately a more efficient ownership 
arrangement, creating greater opportunities across any society and increased political support 
for market based solutions. Meanwhile, “firms controlled by heirs tend to have lower 
performance within their industries and lower spending on research and development (p 
123).”xvi Villalonga and Amit (2004) also find that family firms controlled by heirs destroy 
value. Zingales and Rajan go as far as to argue that taxation, particularly inheritance tax, 
should be, “structured so that the rich are encouraged to transfer passive ownership of 
productive assets (for example, minority stakes in a portfolio of firms), rather than active 
control, to their children (p. 299).”xvii  
 
In conclusion, current European ownership structures are a function of the complex 
interaction of historic national regulation, tax codes, strength of institutional investors and 
individual/family wealth preferences, constraints and psychology. The balancing of these 
interests through the political process at country level has been a prime determinant of current 
corporate structures. However, as we have demonstrated, these structures are far from 
efficient for society in aggregate, and Europe would benefit from changing its ownership 
structures. 
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Italy - Risk-Adjusted
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 Appendix II: Industry Distribution per Ownership Category 
 
Italy Legal Control De facto control Widely held 
1 0% 0% 0% 
2 3% 17% 0% 
3 11% 11% 0% 
4 26% 11% 7% 
5 10% 11% 7% 
6 7% 0% 0% 
7 7% 6% 0% 
8 25% 28% 87% 
9 11% 17% 0% 
N 61 18 15 
    
Spain Legal Control De facto control Widely held 
1 7% 0% 11% 
2 7% 11% 15% 
3 5% 5% 0% 
4 10% 37% 11% 
5 20% 5% 15% 
6 12% 16% 7% 
7 2% 11% 4% 
8 22% 11% 26% 
9 15% 5% 11% 
  41 19 27 
    
France Legal Control De facto control Widely held 
1 2% 0% 3% 
2 4% 0% 18% 
3 12% 15% 21% 
4 26% 23% 9% 
5 8% 8% 9% 
6 24% 8% 12% 
7 12% 8% 9% 
8 6% 23% 9% 
9 6% 15% 12% 
  50 13 34 
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Germany Legal Control De facto control Widely held 
1 0% 0% 0% 
2 2% 8% 16% 
3 16% 17% 19% 
4 31% 33% 29% 
5 3% 8% 6% 
6 17% 0% 0% 
7 5% 0% 3% 
8 12% 8% 23% 
9 14% 25% 3% 
  58 12 31 
    
UK Legal Control De facto control Widely held 
1 0% 0% 3% 
2 40% 0% 11% 
3 0% 0% 8% 
4 40% 33% 23% 
5 0% 0% 2% 
6 20% 0% 16% 
7 0% 67% 9% 
8 0% 0% 12% 
9 0% 0% 16% 
  5 3 92 
    
10-19: Energy and water supply industries 
20-29: 
Extraction of minerals and ores other than fuels; manufacture of metals, mineral products and 
chemicals 
30-39: Metal goods, engineering and vehicles industries 
40-49: Other manufacturing industries 
50-59: Construction   
60-69: Distribution, hotels and catering; repairs 
70-79: Transport and communication 
80-89: Banking, finance, business services and leasing 
90-99: Other services  
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ENDNOTES 
 
i  Although Alfred Marshall had contemplated this problem at the end of the 19th Century – (Marshall, 1897).  
ii  See Yergin and Stanislaw (2002), for details of the intellectual reasoning and battles behind privatisation.
iii  The internal control mechanisms include, amongst others, the Board of Directors, the remuneration structure 
of executive and non-executive members, and the degree of ownership concentration. Outside control 
mechanisms include the market for corporate control, top management turnover and shareholder activism as 
well as legal protection of investors. 
iv  These are calculated as the percentage of market capitalisation captured by dominant shareholders beyond 
their equity stake. 
v  The European Large Holdings Directive from 1988 (88/627/EEC) requires firms to report an increase of the 
ownership stake above 10%/20%/33%/50%/75%. Companies have to notify both company and regulator. 
However, certain countries set lower thresholds in this respect. This data is in itself flawed as companies 
have to report an increase in their shareholding, but not a decrease (BaFin, 2002). 
vi  A subcategory of legal control is absolute power. Thresholds for this category differ between countries, but 
falling within it would allow the shareholder to cast the deciding vote on corporate reorganisations, mergers 
and equity issuance. 
vii  The Spanish mandatory bid threshold is graduated. If a shareholder acquires, or intends to acquire, above 
25% of a company, he must launch a bid for at least 10% of the capital. If he holds a stake of between 25% 
and 50%, and wishes to increase this by more than 6% in the following 12 months, again he must bid for at 
least 10% of the capital. To increase a holding above 50%, he must bid for at least 75% of a firm. For 
research purposes we take 25% as the de facto control threshold.  
viii  Based on Student’s t test. 
ix  Dyck and Zingales (2004) also find a control premium on block trades of approximately 10% in Germany, 
but substantially lower, at 2% in France (however, this finding is based on 14 positive observations for 
Germany, but only 2 for France). 
x   The Nenova survey does not cover Spain because dual share classes are rarely used. Dyck and Zingales 
(2004) find private control benefits equal to 4% on 4 positive observations. 
xi  Since Nenova draws her sample from all listed firms in the UK, it is likely that the observations relate to 
smaller firms outside of the FTSE 100. Our finding based on the top 100 public firms in the UK, is that none 
have dual classes of shares. Therefore, we would argue that Dyck and Zingales 2% is a better indicator of 
private control benefits in the UK. 
xii  This is not to deny that there are important UK policy questions relating to the ability of dispersed investors 
in widely held firms to monitor management and build coalitions to enforce their rights. However, this is a 
debate about strengthening corporate governance mechanisms, not reforming ownership structures.  
xiii  These are defined by Gilson (2003, p 19) as “psychic benefits of control …social and political access”.  
xiv  Particularly since some benefits of diversification can be gained for a dominant shareholder through 
derivatives transactions, which can be more tax efficient and do not require disclosure. 
xv  See Demsetz (1968), Stoll and Whaley (1983) and Amihud and Mendelson (1986). 
xvi  Statement based on data from Morck (2000) and Perez-Gonzalez (2002). 
xvii  This would seem to imply that inter-generational asset transfers, perhaps above the national mandatory bid 
threshold which defines control, should be subject to steeply progressive taxation. 
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